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Research Questions/Issues: Drawing upon insights from research on comparative corporate 
governance and board of directors, we investigate how outside directors serve the functions of 
managerial monitoring and resource provision in different systems of corporate governance. 
Rather than viewing outside directors as functioning independently in the context of 
organizational environment, we conceptualize them as an element of bundles of related corporate 
government practices. Specifically, we explore why and how the different combinations of 
governance practices at national level, such as the legal system, conduct codes, and capital 
markets, and at firm level, such as various types of controlling shareholders, enable or constrain 
outside directors to engage in the monitoring and resource provision roles. Building upon such 
analysis, we develop a new taxonomy of corporate governance systems according to the different 
configurations of a set of interdependent governance characteristics, including national 
governance mechanisms, identity of block shareholders, and functions of outside directors.  
 
Research Insights: Recent research on comparative corporate governance suggests that it is 
critical to examine complementarity and substitution of corporate governance practices at both 
firm level and national level when we evaluate their effectiveness. This study enriches this 
growing body of research by highlighting the role of bundles of governance practices in 
influencing directors’ engagement in governance behavior, and consequently advancing our 
understanding on variation in corporate governance systems across and within countries.   
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: By explicitly considering how different governance 
practices at national level and firm level complement and substitute each other, this paper 
demonstrates that the roles of outside directors depends on the interaction between a bundle of 
governance mechanisms rather than any individual mechanisms. The paper also goes beyond the 
traditional governance models based on the national context and highlights that 
interdependencies of corporate governance practices play an important role in explaining the 
diversity and variation of corporate governance arrangements across firms in both industrialized 
economies and emerging markets.  
 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This paper provides insights to policy makers by suggesting 
that not all the governance bundles are conducive to managerial monitoring and resource 
provision by outside directors. To enhance desirable director functions, the government may 
improve national-level governance institutions, while firms may promote complementary types 
of block shareholders. 
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In the presence of many corporate scandals in recent years (e.g., Enron Scandal, 
WorldCom Fraud), increased debate on and interest in the roles and effectiveness of outside 
directors has emerged in academia, industry, and regulatory institutions in both developed and 
emerging economies (e.g., Carter & Lorsch, 2004; CSRC, 2001). The vast bulk of research on 
the antecedents of directors’ behavior conceptualizes outside directors as an independent 
governing mechanism whose efficacy is determined by directors’ incentives and ability to 
engage in two primary functions, monitoring the management and providing 
resources/counseling to the management (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Agency theorists contend that independence of outside directors 
brings greater transparency, efficiency, and accountability to managerial monitoring (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Resource dependence theorists view outside directors as critical resource 
providers who, use their human and social capital to provide advice and counseling, connections 
to other organizations, access to external resources, and legitimacy to the firm (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Theoretically, the presence of outside directors should lead to better firm 
performance, but the empirical findings about the performance implication of such directors are 
mixed (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Peng, 
2004; Westphal, 1999).  
One explanation for the divergent findings is that those studies focus on outside directors 
per se without considering their relationships with other governance mechanisms. To the extent 
that various corporate governance practices coexist within and outside firms, they collectively 
constitute the context of governance environments that imposes both constraints and enablers on 
outside directors (Filatotchev, 2008; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). To 
better explain the behavior of those directors and their willingness to engage in specific 
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governance tasks, it is necessary to take a set of interrelated corporate governance practices into 
consideration.  
Specifically, we go beyond the traditional “actor-centered” approach that focuses on the 
personal characteristics of outside directors and adopt the original configurational approach to 
discuss how the interdependencies between multi-level corporate governance mechanisms shape 
outside directors’ behavior in managerial monitoring and resource provision (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, Desender, & Castro, 2011; Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 2009). We 
argue that outside directors’ willingness to engage in the two governance functions depends on 
the benefits and costs related to the legal and regulatory environment, as well as social structural 
relationships between corporate elites. Agency theorists suggest that national governance 
systems based on formal legal systems and informal standards affect the protection of 
shareholders and information disclosure through enforcement of corporate laws, voluntary 
compliance with conduct codes, and market for corporate control (La Porta et al. 1998; Shleifer 
& Vishny 1997; Weimer & Pape, 1999). Well-developed national governance systems may 
promote outside directors to fulfill their obligations by supplying requisite information for 
decision-making and imposing high costs on them if they fail to accomplish the tasks (Davis, 
2002; Hartley, 2009). Meanwhile, the sociological perspective of corporate governance indicates 
that outside directors’ behavior is also influenced by informational and incentive constraints and 
their interplay with organizational elites, such as large owners (North, 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 
2013). We hence consider how firm ownership structure (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010; Morck, 
Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005) and national governance system collectively shape outside 
directors’ engagement in monitoring and resource provision.  
5 
 
By focusing on three types of prevailing owners (i.e., family, state, and dispersed 
institutional investors) and two types of national governance systems (well-developed vs. under-
developed), we investigate how governance mechanisms interact with each other in particular 
legal and socially situated contexts and consequently influence outside directors’ behavior. 
Furthermore, we regard the interrelated governance mechanisms as a governance bundle and 
develop a taxonomy of corporate governance models based on the different configurations of the 
governance bundle. 
 Our discussion on the interaction between outside directors and other governance 
practices highlights the role of corporate governance bundles in shaping outside directors’ 
governance behavior and consequently helps explain the variation in outside directors’ roles 
across and within countries. Moreover, we enrich the literature on comparative corporate 
governance by offering a new categorization of corporate governance models that integrates 
firm-level and national-level governance mechanisms. In so doing, we respond to calls from 
scholars such as Aguilera, Desender, and Castro (2011) for more fine-grained taxonomies of 
corporate governance models that go beyond the traditional dichotomous models in which the 
national context equates with governance systems.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we develop the construct of corporate 
governance bundle by conceptualizing national governance system and ownership structure as 
two critical components that interact with each other and subsequently affect outside directors’ 
governance behavior. Second, we develop specific propositions about how outside directors’ 
willingness to engage in managerial monitoring and resource provision is contingent on the 
configurations of corporate governance practices. Finally, we discuss the implications of this 
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configurational approach for future research and for multiple effective designs of corporate 
governance bundles.  
MULTI-LEVEL COPORATE GOVERNANCE BUNDLES 
Corporate Governance Bundles 
The concept of a “bundle of governance mechanisms” was initially introduced by 
Rediker and Seth (1995) and has been attracting increasing scholarly attention. It refers to a 
combination of corporate governance practices that interact and consequently complement or 
substitute each other as a bundle of related practices (Aguilera et al., 2011; Rediker & Seth, 
1995; Ward et al., 2009). A number of studies have provided insights on the governance bundles, 
putting board of directors as part of the intertwined mechanism. One line of research focuses on 
the complementary and substitutive relationships between firm-level mechanisms, particularly 
between board of directors and other firm-level mechanisms. For example, Rediker and Seth 
(1995) find substitution effects between board monitoring, monitoring by outside shareholders, 
and managerial incentive alignment. Desender and his colleagues (2013) demonstrate that board 
function of monitoring is contingent on firm ownership and the type of controlling shareholder. 
Hoskisson, Castleton and Withers (2009) propose that intense monitoring will lead to higher 
executive compensation in the long run because managers under close monitoring bear higher 
employment and career risks that need to be offset by higher compensation. Ward and his 
colleagues (2009) suggest that firm performance determines how external monitoring by 
institutional investors and internal monitoring by boards function as complements or substitutes. 
These studies show that board is an important internal governance mechanism whose efficacy 
depends on its interplay with other mechanisms. However, as most studies are conducted within 
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a single national governance system (except Desender et al., 2013), they are silent in how the 
intertwining mechanisms of firm-level bundles may vary across nations or institutional contexts.  
Another line of research investigates the governance bundles composed of multi-level 
governance mechanisms, wherein board of directors operates in. For example, Weimer and Pape 
(1999) present two systems, i.e., market-oriented system characterized by dispersed ownership 
structure with an efficient market for corporate control and network-oriented system in which 
controlling owners or other oligarchic groups determine managerial decisions via cross-
shareholdings and interlocking directorships. Franks and Mayer (2001) develop the “insider” and 
“outsider” paradigms based on corporate ownership and control systems. The insider system, 
mainly adopted by Continental European countries, features monitoring and control by owners 
with large stakes in firms and cooperation between majority shareholders and management 
(Barca & Becht, 2001). In contrast, the outsider system prevalent in the U.S. and the U.K. is 
characterized by oversight and control by company outsiders, such as non-executive board 
members and active market for corporate control, rather than by owners. 
 Although these models are insightful, they implicitly assume that dispersed ownership 
structure is associated with well-developed national governance system characterized by strong 
legal protection of shareholders and efficient capital market, and concentrated ownership often 
goes hand-in-hand with under-developed national governance system where weak legal 
protection of shareholders and ineffective capital market are prevalent. However, there are firms 
with block shareholders in countries that have well-developed governance systems, such as 
Microsoft, Ford, and Wal-Mart in the U.S., and firms with dispersed ownership in countries with 
relatively weak governance systems, including China, India, and Continental Europe. Indeed, the 
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“within-country differences” in corporate governance mechanisms across firms are much larger 
than scholars have assumed so far (Jacoby, 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
heterogeneity in corporate governance practices within a particular national corporate 
governance system when explaining the relationship between corporate governance bundles and 
firm outcomes (García-Castro, Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013). Moreover, prior studies mainly focus 
on board structure in different national systems, paying little attention to the interaction between 
board functions, especially the role of outside directors, and other governance mechanisms.  
As an important internal governance mechanism, outside directors are likely to be 
influenced by other relevant components in a governance bundle when determining their 
engagement in monitoring and resource provision. Our focus on the interplay between national 
governance system, corporate ownership structure, and outside directors will allow us to better 
understand the function of this governance mechanism.  
National Governance System 
National governance system is designed and implemented to minimize agency cost (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). It consists of formal institutions such as laws and 
regulations, political and economic rules and procedures, and other explicit constraints on firm 
behavior, as well as informal institutions including unwritten, yet quite influential, societal 
norms, conventions, codes of conduct and values (North 1990). These formal and informal 
institutions engender organizational forms in a country, which in turn determine the distribution 
of power – how ownership is assigned, managerial decisions are made and monitored, 
information is audited and released, and profits and benefits allocated and distributed (Cornelius 
& Kogut, 2003).   
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As an important element of national governance system, legal system, or what North calls 
“formal constraints” (1990), defines the structure, obligations, and rights of economic actors 
including those of shareholders, board directors, and managers. The legal system also involves 
third-party enforcement mechanisms that ensure economic actors obey laws and regulations in 
economic activities. Prior research suggests that the effectiveness of a national governance 
system hinges on the development of the legal system. An effective legal system protects 
shareholders from being expropriated by the firm’s management, and protects minority 
shareholders from being expropriated by large blockholders (La Porta, et al, 1997; 1998; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2010). Hence, the presence of comprehensive laws and regulations 
together with effective enforcement mechanisms indicates a well-developed national governance 
system.  
The U.S. has a national governance system typically dominated by formal institutions. It 
developed an extensive body of securities and corporate law (i.e., ‘hard law’) at both the federal 
and state levels. The most recent manifestation of the hard law approach in the U.S. was the 
passage of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, in which the U.S. Congress mandated 
stringent governance regulations and increased the costs of noncompliance to all public firms. 
Through legislative action, SOX required firms to put in place a number of measures intended to 
reduce conflicts and enhance the role of independent directors.  
Facing more stringent corporate laws and governance regulations, the board is under 
greater pressure to perform its regulatory duty.  Shareholders can exercise their voting power on 
director selections and even sue directors or the majority owners for suspected expropriation (La 
Porta et al., 2000). The regulatory agency can also punish board members for their negligence.  
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Moreover, the effective enforcement mechanisms also dictate the mandatory information 
disclosure and regulate market intermediaries (Black, 2001; Coffee, 1999; Levine, 1998; Levine 
& Zervos, 1996; Pistor et al., 2000), thus alleviating information asymmetry and reducing 
information cost (Black & Kraakman, 1996; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 1999). In addition, on 
the basis of clear legal requirements of board duties and information disclosure, capital markets 
can serve as an effective external governance mechanism (Black, 2001; Coffee, 1999; Levine, 
1998; Levine & Zervos, 1996; Pistor et al., 2000) through allocative and disciplinary measures 
and takeover mechanisms (Samuel, 1996; Singh, 2003). For example, the stock market and the 
market for corporate control can improve corporate governance and firm performance by 
replacing inefficient managers and transferring the firm assets to those who can manage them 
more efficiently through hostile takeovers, management buy-outs, and leveraged buy-outs 
(Jensen, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
The national governance system may also be dominated by informal institutions, for 
example in the U.K., where voluntary compliance with conduct code dominates the governance 
activities, and legislative framework does not specify rules on corporate governance mechanism 
(Moore et al., 2012). Such voluntary compliance is supported by firms’ efforts to gain 
sociopolitical and cognitive legitimacy either through obtaining certification by the third parties 
(e.g., highly prestigious underwriters, credible venture capital firms) (Moore et al., 2012), or 
through enhancing reputation via the market intermediaries (e.g., financial analysts and bond 
rating agencies) (Luo & Chung, 2013). In the national governance system dominated by informal 
institutions, the maintenance of reputation and legitimacy is the major driving force for voluntary 
regulative approach.  
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In well-developed national governance systems, the effective enforcement of corporate 
laws and voluntary compliance of conduct codes may protect shareholders from expropriation by 
the management and large blockholders. The effective enforcement  may also motivate outside 
directors to fulfill their obligations by providing requisite information and imposing higher 
litigation, reputation and legitimacy costs on failure in governance tasks. In contrast, in under-
developed national governance systems where laws, regulations and conduct codes regarding 
corporate governance are either absent or cannot be enforced effectively (Rajagopalan & Zhang, 
2008), outside directors’ incentive to fulfill their obligations are likely to be weak because of 
information asymmetry, weak legal protection of shareholders, ineffective market for corporate 
control and consequently, relatively low risk of punishment for failure to perform their 
governance roles. Typical examples include China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and other emerging 
economies.  
Shareholders as a Corporate Governance Mechanism 
The ownership structure is diverse across countries, with dispersed ownership prevailing 
in the U.S.- and U.K. -listed firms, and concentrated ownership more prevalent in Continental 
Europe (La Porta, et al, 1999) and transition and emerging economies (Douma, Rejie & Rezaul, 
2006). Shareholders may act as an internal governance mechanism through their control over 
stakes in firms and such shareholder control can range from a sole majority owner to numerous 
small shareholders. Compared with small shareholders, controlling shareholders have both 
stronger incentives and superior power to discipline and influence management because of their 
large stakes in the firms and their authority in decision-making, sometimes derived from 
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pyramidal ownership structure and possession of multiple key managerial positions (Morck et 
al., 2005).   
Shareholder control is likely to influence other elements of the corporate governance 
bundle, particularly board behaviors. Desender et al. (2009) show that controlling shareholders 
influence the priorities of the board to engage in monitoring and resource provision. For 
example, boards of widely held firms focus more on monitoring. However, they regard 
controlling shareholders as homogeneous, neglecting the fact that different types of owners differ 
in their interests, objectives and even resource endowment (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Peng, Tan, & 
Tong, 2004), and thus may exert different demands on boards and disciplinary effects on 
managers (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Desender and his 
colleagues (2013) differentiate types of owners and demonstrate how their differential incentives 
and capabilities to monitor management affect the monitoring role of the board, but the resource 
provision role of the board is left on the sideline in their study.  
Our focus is the impact of different types of owners on outside directors’ role in 
managerial monitoring and resource provision. In particular, we consider three typical types of 
controlling shareholders prevalent in developed economies and emerging economies---dispersed 
ownership, concentrated ownership of family, and concentrated ownership of the state. Because 
these ownership structures may exist in both well-developed and under-developed national 
governance systems, we match the types of ownership and the development of national 
governance system and obtain six different combinations, as shown in Table 1. The governance 
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Outside Directors as a Governance Mechanism 
Corporate governance literature indicates that outside directors generally serve two 
functions: managerial monitoring and resource provision (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Monitoring is emphasized in agency theory, which posits that 
outside directors monitor decision making by managers who may act to maximize their self-
interests (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The resource provision function is more 
consistent with a resource dependence perspective. Taking advantage of their expertise, 
knowledge, skills, and ties to external organizations, directors provide a firm with advice and 
counseling, information channels with external organizations, access to external resources, and 
legitimacy, thereby enhancing firm performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 Outside directors need to calculate the benefits and costs related to the engagement in 
specific roles. From an agency theory perspective, a well-developed national governance system 
increases the litigation cost and reputation cost of outside directors’ negligence in fulfilling 
monitoring role (Davis, 2002; Hartley, 2009), but reduces information cost and hence facilitates 
timely provision of advice and needed resources (Aguilera, et al, 2008). Thus, outside directors 
are likely to engage in both monitoring and resource provision in such a context. In contrast, they 
may have weak incentives to fulfill these obligations in an under-developed national governance 
system because they bear little costs for playing an ineffective governance role and the 
considerable information asymmetry further depresses their incentives.  
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From a sociological perspective, outside directors’ interactions with corporate leaders 
engender various social benefits and social costs that may influence those directors’ willingness 
to fulfill their obligations. On one hand, providing advice and resources to corporate managers 
may be regarded as ingratiatory behavior that is likely to invoke those managers and also 
dominant owners to return a favor to outside directors. For instance, prior research indicates that 
directors who engage in ingratiatory behavior toward dominant owners are more likely to gain 
recommendations for board appointments at other firms (Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007). Such 
norm of reciprocity is likely to motivate outside directors to engage in resource provision. On the 
other hand, managerial monitoring may induce social costs that discourage outside directors to 
play the monitoring role. First, strong oversight and control lead to negative feelings and social 
distance between managers and directors (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Sitkin & Roth, 1993), 
because managers view such behavior as a hostile signal. Outside directors who closely monitor 
and challenge the CEOs are often punished through social distancing in the U.S. context 
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003). For example, they may have little chance to be invited to informal 
meetings and their advice is less likely to be solicited and adopted at formal meetings. They are 
also effectively sanctioned in the director labor market as indicated by the decreased chance of 
additional board appointments (Westphal & Stern, 2007). Second, strong monitoring may result 
in “generalized retaliation” by CEO-directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1997). CEOs who were 
subjected to increased board control at their home companies retaliate by promoting greater 
board independence and control at firms where they serve as outside directors, thus reducing 
fellow CEOs’ power and influence. In light of such reciprocal retaliation, CEO-directors are not 
likely to engage in managerial monitoring so as to avoid future retaliation.  
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We analyze in the following how the trade-off between the foregoing benefits and costs 
arising from national governance systems and corporate ownership structures shape outside 
directors’ willingness to monitor management and provide resources in the six different contexts 
displayed in Table 1. Our analysis also engenders a new taxonomy of corporate governance 
systems based on configurations of the proposed governance bundle.  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BUNDLES AND ROLES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
Dispersed ownership in under-developed national governance systems 
In firms with dispersed ownership structure, their ownership is often dominated by 
portfolio-oriented institutional investors, with ownership stakes of typically less than 3% per 
investor (Barker, 2006). Examples of firms controlled by institutional owners include Kaufman 
& Broad and Rexel in France, and Vedanta Resources in the U.K. When ownership is diffused, it 
is difficult for dispersed shareholders to coordinate their monitoring activities and is not 
worthwhile for each investor to monitor the company on a continuing basis due to the free-rider 
problem (Aguilera, 2005; Davies, 2002; Grossman & Hart, 1980). Consequently, the problem of 
misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers arises, with managers and 
shareholders having different degrees of access to firm-specific information, and strong 
managers engaging in self-serving activities that may be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth 
maximization. 
To reduce the agency costs, institutional investors are likely to depend on board of 
directors, especially outside directors, in monitoring the management. Outside directors are not 
related to the firms and thus can be more assertive than inside directors when questioning and 
challenging managerial decisions (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Mallin, 2007). At the same 
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time, firms without controlling owners are also likely to rely on outside directors to extract 
resources and advice from their human and social capital, which can help managers make 
qualified decisions and also utilize resources provided by those directors to create competitive 
advantages (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Therefore, firms with dispersed ownership are likely to 
value outside directors’ engagement in both monitoring and resource provision functions equally. 
This creates an environment in which outside directors are more willing to engage in their 
governance roles.  
However, outside directors embedded in an under-developed national governance system 
are less likely to engage in their governance roles because the poor legal protection constrains 
their incentive and ability to utilize their human capital and social capital when monitoring 
management and providing resources. In spite of financial incentives and the credible threat of 
lawsuits if they fail to exercise control (Westphal & Khanna, 2003), outside directors in such a 
context may still lack strong incentives to monitor management for several reasons. First, in a 
national governance system with weak investor protection, it is less likely for dispersed owners 
to sue outside directors primarily due to their difficulty in meeting the demanding standards of 
the minimum percentage and period of shareholding to bring a lawsuit against directors. As in 
the case of China, for example, a shareholder is not able to sue directors for misconduct unless 
the shareholder has individually or collectively held more than 1% of the shares of the company 
for more than 180 consecutive days (Tang, 2008). As a result, outside directors are less likely to 
experience lawsuits and related financial penalties and reputational losses arising from corporate 
fraud. Second, in a weak national governance system where the obligations and rights of board 
and manager are not articulated or enforced properly, outside directors actively engaging in 
monitoring may suffer from more severe social distancing and retaliation imposed by managers, 
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which can adversely affect their job security and career advancement. In addition, outside 
directors need to have the supporting information if they are to identify and vote against an 
inferior project proposed by managers (Raheja, 2005). Such verification costs tend to be high due 
to the lack of public information disclosure and the intentional concealment of information by 
insiders.  
The under-developed national governance system may also inhibit outside directors from 
providing resources and counseling to the management. When facing poor legal protection of 
their interests (La Porta et al., 1999), investors are more reluctant to invest in firms, so outside 
directors are expected to provide legitimacy to enhance investors’ confidence in the firms. 
However, to protect their managerial autonomy, strong managers tend to purposefully restrict 
information from outside directors and keep them out of the inner circle of decision-making, 
making it difficult for those directors to provide useful advice. Moreover, the relatively low 
scrutiny by dispersed owners will likely make outside directors less motivated to provide advice 
and resources. Additionally, given the low takeover risk in the weak market for corporate 
control, the provision of resources and counsel is less critical to prevent takeover. Such an 
ingratiatory behavior is therefore valued less by corporate owners and might not induce 
additional appointment on boards of other firms. Therefore, outside directors’ incentive to 
provide benefits from their social networks for focal firms tend to be highly constrained in 
under-developed national governance systems. Accordingly, we propose 
Proposition 1a: In firms with dispersed ownership in an under-developed national 
governance system, outside directors will engage little in either managerial monitoring 




Dispersed ownership in well-developed national governance systems 
Well-developed national governance contexts such as the U.S. and the U.K. create a 
favorable environment for outside directors to fulfill their board tasks. This is particularly salient 
in promoting managerial monitoring. On one hand, the threat of lawsuits from the institutional 
investors is prominent if outside directors cannot fulfill their responsibility in monitoring. Under 
the U.S. law, a breach of care claim will result in dollars out of the director’s pocket (Davis, 
2002). Although director liability insurance is common, the threat remains credible because 
insurance does not cover criminal charges and the cost of unsuccessfully defending against 
charges of fraud arising from shareholder lawsuits (Hartley, 2009). Hence, outside directors are 
under high pressure from laws and regulations to conduct effective monitoring. Moreover, in the 
presence of effective market for corporate control, outside directors’ ineffective monitoring and 
the consequent fraud or business failure will lead to the loss of investors and even takeover. 
These highly salient consequences expose outside directors to wide publicity and induce high 
reputation costs for them. On the other hand, high transparency leads to enhanced publicity, 
heightened regulatory scrutiny, and more attention to the appointment, evaluation, and removal 
of outside directors (DeMott, 2007), thus protecting those directors from strong managers’ and 
inside board members’ arbitrary treatment and social distancing. As a result, outside directors in 
well-developed national governance systems bear lower litigation, reputation and social costs of 
conducting managerial monitoring, and thus are more likely to engage in managerial monitoring. 
Moreover, a well-developed national governance system may enhance monitoring by 
offering institutionalized channels of information disclosure and sharing. Exchange partners 
follow formal rules and regulations that stipulate each partner’s rights and responsibilities, and 
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are required to disclose the relevant and key information to transaction partners (North, 1990). 
Market intermediaries also play active role in providing quality and timely information (Rajan, 
1992; Von Thadden, 1995). Such institutionalized information disclosure and sharing enable 
outside directors to reduce their reliance on personal relationships with managers to secure 
information and thus to mitigate uncertainty and managerial opportunism. As a result, outside 
directors are able to maintain independence from the management and exercise substantial 
discretion in their managerial monitoring activities with lower information cost.  
The well-developed national governance system is also likely to stimulate outside 
directors to provide resources and advice for three reasons. First, as in the case of monitoring 
role, the national governance system imposes higher litigation cost and reputation cost for 
directors when they fail to fulfill their advisory role.  In addition, in well-developed governance 
systems where information is transparent and capital market reflects corporate performance 
efficiently, outside directors’ outstanding performance in resource provision can enhance their 
reputation and thus induce a fellow director’s recommendation for a board seat at another 
company (Westphal & Stern, 2007). Failure to fulfill their resource provision role may in turn 
damage their reputation and legitimacy in the director labor market. Second, the management of 
firms with dispersed ownership structure tends to drive outside directors to provide resources. 
Given the goal of maximizing financial gains from a portfolio of investments, dispersed 
institutional investors are more concerned about maximizing shareholder value and liquidity than 
other types of owners (Aggarwal et al. 2010; Thomsen & Pedersen 2000), and are inclined to sell 
the shares of the under-performing company (Hirschman, 1970; Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2004). 
Hence, to minimize takeover threats, managers are likely to seek advice and resources from 
outside directors to enhance firm performance. Firms that are under strong government 
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regulations might also rely on outside directors with connections to regulatory authorities (Che, 
1995; Geiger, Lennox & North, 2008). For example, firms might use outside directors as a 
means to facilitate the acquisition of external resources such as government licenses, permits and 
contracts that are critical for the firm’s success (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009). We therefore 
argue that outside directors are likely to engage in both managerial monitoring and resource 
provision in this context. 
Proposition 1b: In firms with dispersed ownership in a well-developed national 
governance system, outside directors will engage in managerial monitoring and resource 
provision to a great extent.  
 
Family ownership in under-developed national governance systems 
Compared to dispersed owners, large and block shareholders have much stronger 
incentives to monitor managers because of their significant economic stakes (Shleifer &Vishny, 
1986). Blockholders also have the power to limit management discretion and ensure that 
decisions made by managers are accountable to shareholders by accessing private value-relevant 
information (Heflin & Shaw, 2000), engaging in corporate policy making with management 
(Bhagat, Black & Blair, 2004; Denis & McConnell, 2003), imposing influence on voting, and 
drawing special attention from management (Useem, 1996). Therefore, blockholders can 
substitute outside directors in monitoring management. The extent to which firms emphasize 
outside directors’ resource provision role will likely depend on the blockholders’ resource 
endowment. 
Among the various blockholders, family owners are characterized by focused portfolios, 
a long-term orientation, great risk aversion, pursuit of both financial returns and socio-emotional 
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wealth, and family members’ possession of senior management positions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007; Hamilton & Kao, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Examples of family-owned firms 
include Samsung Group in Korea, Formosa Group in Taiwan, Oracle Corp. in the U.S., and 
BMW in Germany. The controlling families’ significant ownership stakes in the firms and active 
involvement in management enable them to effectively monitor the management and make sure 
that they take actions to maximize family wealth or to satisfy socio-emotional wealth of family 
owners. Therefore, the controlling family may substitute outside directors in managerial 
monitoring, making those directors play a trivial monitoring role. Indeed, Jaggi, Leung, and Gul 
(2009) find that the monitoring effectiveness of independent boards is lower in family-controlled 
firms than in non-family-controlled firms. In contrast, the controlling family likely prioritizes 
outside directors’ resource provision role. The concentrated family equity holdings result in a 
relative lack of financial portfolio diversification and limited liquidity (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), 
making resources available to family owners limited as compared to other blockholders such as 
the state and the institutional investors. Moreover, viewing the family business as a vehicle for 
family fortune, family stature in the society and the careers of succeeding generations, the 
controlling families do their utmost to maintain firm viability over long-term (Miller & Breton-
Miller, 2005). As a result, family-owned firms are likely to prefer prospective outside directors 
that can generate valuable resources for them.  
The imbalance between outside directors’ two roles in family-owned firms becomes 
particularly salient when the national governance system is under-developed. The lack of 
information provided by the firm and market intermediaries makes outside directors highly 
reliant on internal information sources to play their monitoring role (Luo & Chung, 2013). 
However, in family-owned firms, managers with particularistic ties with the controlling family 
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(e.g., family and prior social ties) form an inner circle which is a typical leadership structure that 
sets the course of planning and development of firms (Hamilton & Kao, 1990). These managers 
are endowed with great decision-making power because they are loyal to the family and embrace 
the controlling family’s authority wholeheartedly (Luo & Chung, 2005). The close interplay 
between family and inner-circle managers may lead to limited information disclosure to outside 
directors because ‘families tend to guard their privacy, and are very careful with whom they 
share confidential information’ (Lester & Cannella, 2006: 762). Moreover, in family-owned 
firms, control may be exercised directly – for example through the removal and replacement of 
directors when the controlling shareholder has the requisite voting power–or indirectly, for 
example through explicit or implicit threats to remove insubordinate directors, without 
concerning about the unwanted attention from regulatory scrutiny and publicity in a less 
transparent national governance system. These attributes of family ownership and weak national 
governance system significantly increase the information cost and social cost for outside 
directors, thus constraining their ability to monitor the management. The limited influence of 
outside directors is well illustrated in the case of Xinyi Science and Technology Company in 
Taiwan. The firm’s outside director, Chen-en Ko (a renowned accounting professor), resigned 
before the firm’s illegal tunneling was brought to court because he was not able to stop the 
leaders from expropriating outside shareholders and did not want to continue his appointment 
(Luo & Chung, 2013).  
In contrast, outside directors of family-owned firms are likely to play an active role in 
providing external resources to managers. In an area where contract enforcement laws are not 
well developed and markets are less efficient, personal contacts become important (Peng & 
Heath, 1996; Xin & Pearce, 1996). Family owners, caring about their wealth, welcome outside 
23 
 
directors for their connections. In turn, by fulfilling a resource provision role, outside directors 
will gain support from the family owners and inside managers, minimizing the social distancing 
while increasing employment opportunity in the future. Anecdotal evidence shows that the 
founding families of Taiwanese business groups usually invite legislators and former 
government officials to sit on the board so that they can derive benefits such as bank loans, 
preferential business treatment, government contracts and entry permits, from their connections 
with the government (Wealth Magazine, 2002). They also tend to have better understanding of 
government policy and thus make wise decisions under the guidance of government-linked 
directors. Following this line of discussion, we propose: 
Proposition 2a: In firms with family controlling shareholders in an under-developed 
national governance system, outside directors will engage in resource provision rather 
than managerial monitoring. 
 
Family ownership in well-developed national governance systems 
 In a well-developed national governance system, outside directors of family-owned firms 
are likely to play a more balanced role in monitoring and resource provision primarily due to the 
higher pressures placed on the board by external capital markets, legal system, and the 
consequent reduced family dominance in corporate governance. Well-developed national 
governance systems, especially systems of the U.S. and the U.K., emphasize transparency, 
disclosure, the separation of ownership from control, and professionalism. In such systems, 
information disclosure is more effective meaning that outside directors can get information not 
only from external market intermediary, but also from institutionalized internal sharing (Ravina 
& Sapienza, 2009). The social cost of monitoring is also lower because family owners are 
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reluctant to induce enhanced negative publicity, heightened regulatory scrutiny, and other 
unwanted attention in their attempt to remove directors (DeMott, 2007). In addition, family-
owned firms in such systems may suffer from an increasing loss of legitimacy when the family’s 
role in corporate governance increases and when managers with relationships with the family are 
hired because these practices contradict the prevailing norms and practices of good corporate 
governance. The compromised legitimacy of family-owned firms can adversely affect firms’ 
financial returns (Bansal & Clelland, 2004) and further damage family’s socio-emotional wealth. 
To mitigate such adverse consequences, family owners are likely to encourage outside directors 
to perform board duties adequately.  
However, we speculate that these outside directors are likely to engage more in resource 
provision than in managerial monitoring because of controlling families’ strong incentive for and 
intense involvement in monitoring the management. When family owners serve as managers, the 
strong alignment of interests between owners and managers substantially reduces their reliance 
on outside directors to monitor management (Garcia & Garcia, 2010). The substitutability 
between outside directors and family owners in monitoring management enables outside 
directors to pay more attention to resource provision. Given the efficient director labor market, 
outside directors’ ingratiatory behavior such as provision of advice and resources is likely to be 
rewarded by family owners and hence such behavior increases their chance of being appointed at 
other boards. Moreover, despite the better protection of minority shareholders in such a 
governance bundle, the fundamental agency problem between the controlling family and 
minority shareholders can still lead to limited information disclosure and transparency and thus 
constrain outside directors’ ability to monitor the management. For example, family firms within 
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the S&P 500 in the U.S. make less disclosure about corporate governance practices than do non-
family firms (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007). Therefore, we posit: 
Proposition 2b: In firms with family controlling shareholders in a well-developed 
national governance system, outside directors will engage more in resource provision 
than in managerial monitoring. 
 
Concentrated state ownership in under-developed national governance systems 
State ownership is prevalent around the world. In an analysis of Forbes Global 2000 list 
of the world’s largest 2000 public companies in the business year 2010-2011, Kowalski et al. 
(2013) revealed that 21 out of 38 OECD countries have a country state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
share higher than zero, with China, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, Norway and Thailand being the ten countries with the highest 
country SOE shares. The report indicated the five sectors with the highest state shares, including 
mining support activities, civil engineering, land transport and transport via pipelines, mining of 
coal and lignite, and the extraction of crude petroleum and gas.  
The key agency problem in state-owned firms is that the state may expropriate minority 
shareholders’ interests. Unlike other blockholders, the state is not only the controlling 
shareholders of state-owned firms, but also regulators that bear the responsibility to balance 
multiple goals, such as maximizing firm profitability, securing social welfare, and protecting 
strategic sectors from foreign competition (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994, 1998; Vickers & Yarrow, 
1989). Under certain circumstances, the state owners may pursue non-profit goals at the expense 
of minority shareholders. For instance, state-owned firms are less likely to reduce redundant 
employees than private firms due to their obligation to help the government maintain 
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unemployment rate low. Although in theory the tax-paying public owns state-owned firms, those 
firms are effectively controlled by bureaucrats or politicians who can manipulate resources of the 
firms to pursue their personal interests, such as securing votes by catering for the interests of 
special interest groups (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Hence, neither profitability nor minority 
shareholders’ interest is likely to be the first priority in state-owned firms. At the same time, by 
undertaking parallel functions as owner and regulator (Aguilera et al., 2011), state owners can 
easily override the regulatory system and acquire external resources. With abundant resources 
available and the pursuit of autonomy and power in making corporate policies, the state owners 
tend to pay little attention to outside directors and often view them as “rubber stamps” that are 
not supposed to either monitor management or provide resources.  
In addition, in an under-developed national governance system, outside directors of state-
owned firms have even weaker incentive and power to execute their monitoring. With under-
developed information disclosure regulations, the state owners are able to shield important 
information from outside directors. For example, when the government subsidizes state-owned 
firms in certain strategically important sectors, it usually requires the bureaucrat executives to 
keep the information within insiders (Eldomiaty & Choi, 2006). Without access to such 
important information, outside directors will not be able to monitor the management effectively. 
Furthermore, considerable evidence shows that social distancing is more pronounced as a result 
of deviant behavior in groups that are socially cohesive because of demographic homogeneity 
and/or network ties among members (Coleman, 1994; Merry, 1984; Scott, 1976; Westphal & 
Khanna, 2003; Wood, 1974). In a state-owned firm, politicians and politically connected 
directors who share the same interests and ideology often dominate the board. Hence, outside 
directors engaging in monitoring are likely to suffer from higher levels of social distancing from 
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the socially cohesive state owners and inside board members. This is particularly the case when 
minority shareholders are not well protected and blockholder’s power is not effectively 
restricted. Powerful blockholders can easily vote to remove outside directors, or informally 
exclude those directors from the decision making process, thus forcing such directors to resign. 
Therefore, outside directors are not likely to play an active monitoring role in state-owned firms 
in an under-developed national governance system due to the high information cost and social 
cost.   
In such a context, outside directors’ function of resource provision is likely to be 
compromised as well. In the absence of well-developed regulations on information disclosure 
and investor protection, being the de facto owner, the state can easily bail out its company by 
providing resources such as subsidy, credit, information and other forms of protection at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Aharoni, 1986). The necessity of having outside directors to 
acquire external resources is therefore low. Further, confronting the inefficient capital markets 
and concomitant low pressure from minority shareholders, the state owner and managers have 
little incentive to seek for outside directors who can provide valuable resources and advice on 
how to improve firm performance. Moreover, with disclosure regulations absent or poorly 
enforced, state owners (i.e., bureaucrats) can purposefully hide critical information from outside 
directors so as to pursue personal or public goals that deviate from or even contradict with 
minority shareholders’ goal of profit maximization. The limited information available makes 
outside directors unable to provide necessary resources and useful advice timely. Liao, Young 
and Sun (2009) find that in China, listed state owned firms are motivated to organize a small, 
insider-controlled board, thus keeping key information and decision making out of the reach of 
outside directors. Hence, the boards of many Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) serve as 
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either the conduit board, which simply relays directions given by ministers, or the symbolic 
board, which is circumvented and uninvolved, making the SOE run as an extension of a 
government department (Frederick, 2011). Therefore, we present the following proposition:  
Proposition 3a: In firms with state controlling shareholders in an under-developed 
national governance system, outside directors will engage little in managerial monitoring 
or resource provision. 
 
Concentrated state ownership in well-developed national governance systems 
In a well-developed national governance system where the board’s responsibility to 
facilitate information disclosure is stipulated and the capital market functions efficiently, the 
regulatory and market pressures on outside directors to fulfill their monitoring role are likely to 
outweigh the opposite pressure from state owner, and thus provide them with strong incentives to 
monitor the management. Meanwhile, a well-developed national governance system may force 
the state owners to disclose critical corporate information through various channels, such as 
board meetings, stock market and the market for corporate control. The resulting transparent 
information will enhance managerial monitoring by outside directors. Moreover, the 
attractiveness of outside directors on the director labor market depends on their competence of 
protecting investors and fulfilling their monitoring obligations. The chance of being revenged by 
the state owners and inside directors is hence likely low when those directors exercise their 
monitoring obligation. Recent examples of Chinese state-owned firms in Hong Kong provide a 
vivid illustration of how the state owners may be forced to allow its board directors to play an 
active monitoring role in a well-developed governance system. Unlike Mainland China, Hong 
Kong maintains high corporate governance standards and has developed a sophisticated legal 
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system to well protect shareholders. Although enterprises from Mainland China were at the 
bottom of the list in terms of corporate governance in 2003 (Li, 2012), a study in 2012 shows 
that six of the top-ten firms with the best corporate governance practices in Hong Kong are state-
owned or backed by state-owned enterprises from Mainland China, such as the Bank of China, 
China COSCO, China Life, CNOOC, ICBC, and Lenovo Group (Zhang, 2012). As suggested in 
the study, this significant improvement is mainly attributed to the well-developed corporate 
governance system in Hong Kong, which stimulates the large state-owned enterprises to devote 
time and efforts to improving transparency and clarifying the rights and responsibilities of boards 
of directors. This implies that outside directors in state-owned firms are likely to fulfill their 
monitoring role in such environment.  
However, even in a well-developed national governance system, state-owned firms may 
still enjoy preferential treatments and privileges in obtaining resources. This reduces their 
reliance on outside directors for accessing external resources and lowers their emphasis on such 
directors’ role to establish a linkage to external organizations. Instead, outside directors are more 
likely to engage in managerial monitoring. As a result, outside directors in such a governance 
bundle are likely to focus more on managerial monitoring than on resource provision because of 
the relatively high external pressures for effective corporate governance and low internal demand 
for resource acquisition and provision. Accordingly, we propose: 
Proposition 3b: In firms with state controlling shareholders in a well-developed national 
governance system, outside directors will engage more in managerial monitoring than in 
resource provision. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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We began by noting that outside directors are embedded in a multi-level governance 
system and that their primary roles (monitoring or resource provision) are not independent from 
the context in which focal firms operate. Drawing upon research on the board of directors and 
governance bundle, we argue that the roles of outside directors are determined by their interplay 
with other components in the corporate governance bundle composed of national governance 
system and corporate ownership structure. We further develop a taxonomy of corporate 
governance systems on the basis of six distinct configurations of national governance system, 
corporate ownership structure, and outside directors.  
Our work contributes to the literature on board governance and on comparative corporate 
governance. Our focus on the governance bundle in which outside directors are embedded sheds 
additional light on the antecedents and outcome of their governance behavior in the boardroom. 
In the agency theory framework, outside directors are expected to play an independent 
monitoring role (Fama, 1980).  From the resource dependence perspective, those directors are 
viewed as resource providers who leverage their human and social capital to enhance 
organizational performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, these perspectives disregard 
other governance mechanisms with which the board and individual directors interact and the 
impacts of such interaction on their behavior. We highlight the importance of understanding the 
board roles from a governance bundle perspective (Aguilera et al., 2011). In particular, we 
suggest that outside directors may not be always interested in engaging in managerial 
monitoring. Instead, the importance of outside directors in managerial monitoring is contingent 
on the combination of other governance mechanisms in a governance bundle. By the same token, 
the resource provision role of outside directors may also be promoted or constrained by the 
governance bundle in which they are embedded. In essence, this study emphasizes the 
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importance of considering the fitness between outside directors’ roles and other governance 
mechanisms when studying the functions of board of directors.  
Further, our work contributes to the comparative corporate governance research by 
offering a new multi-level governance taxonomy, in which the national governance system and 
corporate ownership structure are explicitly separated but simultaneously considered. Going 
beyond the prior taxonomies that lump together ownership structure and national governance 
system and focus predominantly on industrialized countries (e.g., Aguirela et al., 2011; Franks & 
Mayer, 1990, 2001; Millar et al., 2005), the newly developed taxonomy provides a more fine-
grained categorization of corporate governance bundles. In particular, we advance the 
understanding of cross-national variation in corporate governance systems around the world by 
differentiating types of owners and their strategic objectives not only in developed economies, 
but also in transition and emerging economies.  
This paper also provides some insights on why the board has been decoupling its 
activities from the codes on book in some countries. Agency theory suggests that outside 
directors are expected to play a more effective role in corporate governance than inside directors 
because of their independence. However, real business stories inform us that outside directors do 
not necessarily engage in their roles as the formal regulatory system expects in both developed 
and developing economies. The behavior of outside directors potentially constitutes a typical 
decoupling case, in which the formal policies and structures are regularly decoupled from an 
organization’s actual internal practices and routines (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This paper 
suggests that decoupling takes place mainly because of differences in cross-firm ownership 
structure and cross-national governance systems. With their dominant power and certain strategic 
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goals, some blockholders are able to constrain the monitoring and resource provision activities of 
outside directors, making those directors merely a ceremonial existence in some contexts. At the 
same time, blockholders, managers, and outside directors interact within a national governance 
system where the effectiveness of legal and regulatory enforcement (North, 1990) and the capital 
market efficiency vary among countries. The differences in national governance systems hence 
also contribute to the varying degrees of decoupling of outside directors’ roles among countries 
(Edelman, 1992). 
We discuss outside directors without differentiating independent directors and affiliated 
directors because our arguments about how the regulatory pressure from the national governance 
system and the social pressure from the owners, managers and peers affect director behavior 
apply to both of them, although the relative importance of the two pressures may slightly differ 
between them. Moreover, the definition of the independence of a director varies across countries 
and over time. General definitions of independence for public-company directors focus on 
criteria indicative of a director’s independence from the company’s management. More specific 
criteria include a direct employment relationship, a non-employment business relationship under 
which the director or an affiliate has received substantial payments from the corporation, a 
family relationship with an executive officer of the corporation, or service as an executive officer 
of another entity with which the corporation has an economically material relationship (DeMott, 
2007). Moreover, managers and outside directors may have social ties (Hwang & Kim, 2009) 
and develop friendship along the way of frequent counseling and advice (Westphal, 1999). 
Future empirical research that examines the different roles of outside directors should make clear 
distinctions between independent and non-independent outside directors that are appropriate in 
each institutional context.  
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Our work also holds important practical implications. First of all, as the board functions 
differently depending on the specific configuration of governance bundle in which it is involved, 
the imposition of a successful foreign governance model does not necessarily lead to desirable 
outcomes. But as suggested in our model, outside directors are generally more engaged in 
managerial monitoring and resource provision in well-developed national governance systems 
than in under-developed ones. Therefore, to encourage outside directors to engage more in 
specific roles, the government needs to advance the national governance system and create a 
favorable environment that promotes desirable director behaviors. Future research may include 
other types of blockholders, such as foreign investors and strategic investors, and other firm-
level governance mechanisms, such as compensation of directors and managers, to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding of corporate governance bundles. Another interesting 
direction for future research is to predict the potential convergence of governance models across 
countries driven by the development of national governance systems and the change in dominant 
ownership structures (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). For example, future research may 
investigate how the role of boards will change in emerging economies such as China and Brazil, 
as a result of substantial changes taking place in the regulatory regimes and the declining 
significance of state ownership in the economy.  
Second, this paper offers implications for the advancement of outside directors’ career. 
Fama and Jensen (1983: 315) conjecture that “outside directors have incentives to develop 
reputations as experts in decision control. . . They use their directorships to signal to internal and 
external markets for decision agents that they are decision experts.” A number of studies have 
supported their hypothesis by showing evidence that outside directors who provide effective 
monitoring or advisory services gain additional outside directorships (Coles & Hoi, 2003; Farrell 
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& Whidbee, 2000; Harford, 2003; Yermack, 2004). Our work suggests that for outside directors 
to improve their career prospects, they should first identify the preferences of different types of 
controlling shareholders in their specific national context and then develop their expertise and 
social networks correspondingly. It might be interesting for future research to examine how 
outside director’ human capital and social capital are developed and embedded in the governance 
bundle involved. We hope that our conceptual framework will motivate further research to enrich 
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Table 1: Outside Directors’ Engagement in Managerial Monitoring and Resource Provision in Different Corporate 
Governance Systems 
                         


























 Low monitoring 
 Low resource 
provision 
     (Proposition 1a) 
 Low monitoring 
 High resource 
provision 
      (Proposition 2a) 
 Low monitoring 
 Low resource 
provision 




 High monitoring 
 High resource 
provision 
    (Proposition 1b) 
 Medium monitoring 
 High resource 
provision 
      (Proposition 2b) 
 High monitoring 
 Medium resource 
provision 
     (Proposition 3b) 
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